Crashing Privacy: An Autopsy of a Web Browser's Leaked Crash Reports by Satvat, Kiavash & Saxena, Nitesh
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
01
71
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 A
ug
 20
18
Crashing Privacy: An Autopsy of a Web Browser’s Leaked Crash
Reports
Kiavash Satvat
University of Alabama at Birmingham
kiavash@uab.edu
Nitesh Saxena
University of Alabama at Birmingham
saxena@uab.edu
ABSTRACT
Harm to the privacy of users through data leakage is not an un-
known issue, however, it has not been studied in the context of
the crash reporting system. Automatic Crash Reporting Systems
(ACRS) are used by applications to report information about the er-
rors happening during a software failure. Although crash reports
are valuable to diagnose errors, they may contain users’ sensitive
information. In this paper, we study such a privacy leakage vis-a-
vis browsers’ crash reporting systems. As a case study, we mine
a dataset consisting of crash reports collected over the period of
six years. Our analysis shows the presence of more than 20,000
sessions and token IDs, 600 passwords, 9,000 email addresses, an
enormous amount of contact information, and other sensitive data.
Our analysis sheds light on an important security and privacy is-
sue in the current state-of-the-art browser crash reporting systems.
Further, we propose a hotfix to enhance users’ privacy and security
in ACRS by removing sensitive data from the crash report prior to
submit the report to the server. Our proposed hotfix can be easily
integrated into the current implementation of ACRS and has no im-
pact on the process of fixing bugs while maintaining the reports’
readability.
1 INTRODUCTION
A few studies were conducted, focusing on legal, financial, reputa-
tional, and other aspects of information disclosure [1, 10, 30]. Some
of these studies analyzed a specific data leakage incident [1, 10].
Similarly, several studies analyzed the security and privacy of web
browsers [8, 19, 31, 35]. However, no previous studywas conducted
to examine the risks that the current implementation of browsers’
Automatic Crash Reporting System (ACRS) may pose to the users’
privacy.
A crash as an inevitable fact occurs when a software terminates
its normal execution process unexpectedly. The use of ACRS is a
common approach to collect crash reports from the users. ACRS
makes troubleshooting smooth amongst a variety of factors con-
tributing to the crash, such as underlying hardware and associated
software. Using ACRS, companies collect crash reports from clients
to address application bugs and improve users’ experience during
web browsing. This information is used by developers to detect
the crash root cause and rectify the bug. Chrome, Firefox, Safari,
and Opera are a few common names that use the ACRS to collect
field crashes [4, 16, 25, 27]. In web browsers, ACRS is designed to
collect the stack trace of the failing thread, user’s system environ-
mental information (e.g., OS and browser version), and probable
user’s feedback on the crash.
However, a fact that has been widely disregarded is the content
of the crash collected from the users’ systems and the amount of
private information that can be found in crash reports which may
pose a threat to the users’ privacy.
In this paper, to demonstrate possible risks that the current
implementation of ACRS may pose to users’ privacy, we study a
dataset of partially anonymized crash reports released by one of
the major browsers1. The current state of the art browsers collect
relatively similar data including browsed URL during the crash and
runtime information, as they can be required for the debugging.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first case study which
scrutinizes a database of 2.5 million partially anonymized crash re-
ports, containing visited URLs, system runtime information and
users’ descriptions. Conducting our inspection, we extracted a sig-
nificant amount of private data including, approximately 20,000
session and token IDs, 600 clear text password, 9,000 email address,
and an enormous amount of contact information, including names,
addresses, and phone numbers. The obtained results signify the de-
ficiency of the current approach and shows the potential for ACRS
to be a compelling target for attackers. Furthermore, to address
this deficiency, we proposed a hotfix to remove the sensitive infor-
mation from the environmental information, users’ feedback, and
visited URLs at the client side prior to disseminating to the server.
Our Contribution. The detail contributions of our system are as
follow.
• Data Analysis (Section 4).We conduct an empirical study on
partially anonymized crash reports released by one of the major
web browsers. Through our inspection, we extract and represent
a significant amount of personal information and confidential
data presented in the reports, delineating to what extent the cur-
rent implementation of ACRS can be harmful to users’ security
and privacy. Our analysis sheds light on an important security
and privacy issue in the current state-of-the-art browser crash
reporting systems.
• Deploying AHotfix (Section 5).According to the result of our
data analysis, we propose a hotfix, to enhance users’ privacy and
security in ACRS, by removing sensitive data from the users’ de-
scription field and URL. Our hotfix can be easily integrated into
the current implementation of ACRS and has no impact on the
process of fixing bugs while maintaining the reports’ readability.
However, it protects users’ private data against unauthorized ac-
cess in the cases server gets compromised or data get leaked.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides the background about ACRS and explains
the dataset used in this study. Section 3 defines the methodology
used to analyze the data and presents the reports. In Section 4, we
present the results of our data analysis. Section 5 describes insights
1The name of the browser, year, and the fields of dataset are removed or anonymized
as discussed in Section 3.1
and countermeasures. Finally, Section 6 concludes our study and
suggests future research directions.
2 STUDY PRELIMINARIES AND DATASET
2.1 ACRS Background
The use of ACRS is a common approach for collecting and handling
crashes. ACRS primarily consists of two main components. First,
what we refer to as Collector, a set of client side libraries which
collects the data from the clients and transfers it to the server for
further processing. Second, the Processor which is a set of servers
and services responsible for analyzing, categorizing, and reporting
the collected crashes. On the client side, Collector, as an interacting
interface between the Processor and clients, runs when the appli-
cation terminates its normal execution process. Collector typically
asks for the users’ permission to send the crash report to Proces-
sor or to quit without sending the report. While choosing to send
the report to the Processor, the user has an option to include the
visited website at the time crash occurred or not. The user also can
provide additional information in the description field to explain
the issue that caused the crash. Additionally, there might be an op-
tion for the user to provide an email address for future support
and contributions. After these steps, Collector transfers a dump of
crash report and collected details to Processor that is responsible
for further processing and presenting for the view of developers
and the general public.
The collected data from clients are referred to as Crash reports.
Each crash report is composed of two components. The first com-
ponent is the stack trace of the failed thread which is generally
referred to the minidump and carries information about the sys-
tem memory. The second component is the runtime information
of the users’ system and the possible feedback provided by the
user. While these details are essential for the developers to detect
where the problem lies, they may contain users’ sensitive informa-
tion. For instance, the minidump as a sensitive chunk of data may
contain information such as username, password, and encryption
key [7]. Also, it is not hard to expect that the runtime information
and users’ comment may carry private information such as contact
details and other sensitive data.
2.2 Dataset
In this paper, we study a dataset of 2,493,278 partially anonymized
crash reports consists of details such as visited URLs, time of the
crash, the client operating system, and user description of the
crash. A dataset aggregated by a major web browser during the
course of 6 years. The current approach employed by the software
companies, including web browsers (e.g., [24, 28]), stores similar
data in crashes. Our close inspection revealed that while some of
the fields were fully anonymized (e.g., field email), unsuccessful
de-identifications of the other fields left a notable amount of sen-
sitive and personal information in the database. Private data like
the usernames, passwords, and emails embedded in the URL field,
or some confidential information in the description field which is
shared by the users. We noticed the presence of three types of data
in this dataset;
• Deleted Fields: Fields like email and login were deleted since
they explicitly carry sensitive information.
• Masked Fields: In this category, some efforts have been taken
for data de-identification. In ip, some records were de-identified
by replacing the last two digits of IP address with zeros.
• Untouched Fields: All fields except email, login and address
apparently remained untouched, however, not necessarily all
of them convey any meaningful information. In this paper, we
mostly focused on these attributes to demonstrate the breach of
the information.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we explain our approach for inspecting and ana-
lyzing the dataset. We also describe the methodology we use to
present our results in Section 4.
3.1 Ethical Consideration
We conducted our research based on a dataset which was initially
published and later removed following a report regarding the pres-
ence of sensitive information. During our scrutiny, however, we no-
ticed the presence of similar data which is widely available for the
public use. Therefore our study aims to highlight a potential pitfall
associated with the current implementation of the ACRS to the re-
searchers, software developers, and the society. Our study neither
propagates the data nor does it draw attention to any specific com-
pany or individual. Hence, we believe our study causes no further
harm to victims. To preserve the privacy of associated individuals,
companies and third parties, and avoid working directly with this
sensitive information, we used complex queries and avoided per-
forming a manual check. Therefore, all results provided in Section
4 represents a close estimation based on the output of our queries.
For the presentation, we removed identifiable information from
our results, including but not limited to the names of individuals,
websites, applications, companies and their contact information,
such as phone numbers and addresses. The de-identification pro-
cess was performed using a python script replacing this sensitive
information with asterisks.
Similarly, we removed all dataset related details which may
imply a vendor or result in identifying an individual including
names, years, and other traceable information. We also changed
the dataset’s fields’ names to avoid defaming company by possible
cross referencing of presented data in this paper.
3.2 Our Approach
Main Fields of the Database. In this study, we mainly focus on
two fields of url and description which carry more sensitive
information.
• description. To understand what might be laid in this field we
considered the following questions: “What are the possible users’
feedbacks on crashes?” ,“What might be the response of an expert
user to the crash?”, “Is it possible that a user shares his private
information over the description field?”. According to these ques-
tions, we mined the fields, using keywords such as “username”,
“password”, “my phone number”, and “please contact me” to in-
spect the presence of gripping information and the data that may
impact users’ privacy.
• url. Similarly, for the URL field, we considered the following
questions: “ what sort of information the URL can carry?”, “Is
it possible to find any sensitive information embedded in URL?”,
“What if the browser crashes at the time that user presses the lo-
gin button to access his account?”, “What if the browser crashes
when a user presses the submit button to register to a website or up-
load a form?”, “What if the browser crashes when an attacker was
launching an attack against a website?”. According to these ques-
tions, and using keywords such as “username=”, “password=”,
we mined this field to extract those records that may be harmful
to users’ security and privacy.
Cross Referencing.We performed no cross referencing between
the different fields of the database or with other auxiliary resources
such as social networks or previously published datasets. We be-
lieve that doing so can result in exposure of more private infor-
mation. For instance, an attacker can locate an unpopular/distinct
platform (platforms that are being used in a particular industry
e.g., banks) by cross referencing between the database fields, such
as ip, platform, language. Using these fields, the attacker can ob-
tain the approximate location (e.g. city), and then spot the exact
location using the date and platform fields.
3.3 Categorizing Data Breach Severity
A variety of risk analysis methodologies are proposed to appraise
and calculate the breach severity and the impact of the associated
risks [13, 34]. These methods consider several factors, including
context or type of the data, source of the leakage, and potential
impact to rank the severity of each incident. These methods are
applicable to all previously reported incidents, as the majority of
these leakages consist of one type of entity. For instance, in the case
of the JPMorgan [29], as one of the most severe data breaches of all
time [15], users’ contact information breached. In the case of Mys-
pace data breach [39], subscribers’ account details were subjected
to the breach. This similarity makes the assessment and evalua-
tion of the associated risk relatively easy. However, in the case of
browsers data leakage, we deal with a set of dissimilar and indepen-
dent records, each being generated by a different user and in a dis-
parate circumstance. For instance, while a record may only carry
simple data about user’s browsing, the other may convey user’s
medical condition or financial details. This diversity adds complica-
tions and gives each of these records its own unique characteristic
and makes the prior methodologies defective towards this dataset.
Therefore, to present the result of our inspection, we define three
categories of risk severity that are designed to address our specific
needs and are compatible with the current dataset. We present the
data based on their severity into three categories:
• Low Risk: This category presents those records which does not
impact individuals’ privacy, but accessing them may provide ad-
ditional information to an attacker, helping to launch targeted
attacks against specific population (e.g., users who are using a
particular operating system in a small region or a specific range
of IP address). This information may also be interesting to the re-
searchers and developers as they statistically represent the web
population.
• Medium Risk: This category presents those records which do
not compromise users’ privacy or security, but a cross referenc-
ing with an auxiliary information can turn them into a threat to
the users’ privacy.
• High Risk: This category presents records which explicitly vi-
olate users’ privacy and contains users’ sensitive information
such as username, password, and contact details. Similar to the
data presented in the previous categories data appeared in this
category can be shared by users through description or URL
field.
4 DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate the results of our data analysis and
present them based on the severity level introduced in Section 3.
4.1 Low Risk
As discussed in Section 3.3, under the low risk category, we present
information which does not violate privacy, but at the same time is
highly descriptive in terms of providing statistical details, and can
be a representative of the whole Internet users population. In con-
trast to reports offered bymeasurement websites (e.g., [22, 38]), our
dataset encompasses a wide range of users, while they were visit-
ing various websites. Moreover, the data has been collected over
the course of six years and has no correlation with any specific ap-
plication, company, or individual, which signifies the impartiality
of our dataset.
Platforms and Protocols. Market share websites (e.g., [32, 33])
are the main source, to obtain statistic on the popularity of differ-
ent platforms on the Internet. These websites build their database
using the obtained data from their visitors’ browsers. Unlike these
reports, the random distribution of users in the current dataset
provides a more accurate statistic on the popularity of different
platforms. In this study, such information were extracted from the
platform field. Similarly, same approach can be taken to extract
the of various web protocols amongst websites. Unlike other re-
ports, which target the specific domains (e.g. most popular web-
sites [18] ) , the current dataset formed from a wide range of users
and can be counted as a small sample of the whole web population.
IdentifiedAttacks.Considering the fact that a significant number
of attacks against websites are launched through URL, we queried
the url to detect the presence of common attacks such as SQL In-
jection, Local File Inclusion, and Directory Traversal. Below are
some of the known attacks we found during our inspection.
• SQL Injection: We used a combination of keywords such as
“select”, “from”, “where” and “union” to detect the presence of
SQL injection. Below URL illustrates a situation in which the at-
tacker’s browser crashed while he was launching a SQL attack
against a website.
http://www.******.com/photo/gallery/search.php?
search_user=x%2527%20union%20select%20user_password
%20froum%204images_user%20where%20Andrew%20Whyte=
%2572
• Directory Traversal: In this form of attack, the attacker can get
access to restricted directories of the web servers (e.g., root direc-
tory). The attacker can use expression “../” to instruct the system
to move between directories. To look up this type of attack, we
searched for “../” as a keyword. The following is an instance of
this attack found in our database.
http://www.*****.com/de_old/index.html?prm_popup=../../
• Phishing Attack: Since it was not possible to search for all the
websites, except by querying the url, we tried to inspect the
users feedback on the crash. The below example is a paradigm
where the user was trying to report a phishing website.
http://******/www.wellsfargo.com/
Similarly, we used a same approach to extract other suspicious
records. For instance, we searched for “/etc/passwd/” as a keyword
for detecting the Local File Inclusion or “document.cookie” for the
Cross Site Scripting (XSS).
4.2 Medium Risk
IP Address. We observed three types of IPs in ip. The first type
contains IPs which were fully deleted, the second type consists of
records which were masked by turning into “10.2.0.0” and finally
261,388 records that were partially anonymized by replacing the
last two blocks of IP with zeros. Moreover, a close inspection of
the url revealed a significant number of URLs with embedded IP
addresses. The below sample shows an IP address inside a URL.
http://******/?getpostdata=get&name=******&site=
submit&ip=**.**.**.**&ref=000/
Email.We extracted 9139 emails including personal and business
email addresses. Out of which 7731 email obtained from the de-
scription field, while the remaining 1462 extracted from the URLs.
The below sample shows an embedded email inside the URL.
https://*****.net/activate.php?user=*****137199&
email=*****@gmail.com/
Location.A fraction of users could have been located based on the
data in url and description fields. locating users can occur either
through the URL (e.g. when the user was trying to submit a regis-
tration formwith an embedded address in URL) or by querying the
description for the cases which user shared his address.
4.3 High Risk
Username and Password. We were able to pinpoint over 621
passwords. This number of users’ credentials further escalate the
severity of this leakage when we consider the fact of the perva-
siveness of password reuse (43-51%) [12]. Some of these passwords
were extracted from theURL, and the rest were embedded in the de-
scription field. In the case of URL, the credentials were exposed due
to the weaknesses in design and development of the application
where both the HTTP and GET method have been used to trans-
fer the sensitive data between client and server while this method
of transferring has been refused by the standards [37]. Below URL
demonstrates a case where the browser crashed when a user was
about to log into a website.
http://******/logon.do;jsessionid=abbTXFV3-1BSw7?
username=******&password=******/
The next series of passwords were extracted from the
description, where the user shared his password in the descrip-
tion field of Crash Reporter aiming to receive future support.
I can login but the ****** don’t remember password
for this site. I tell you the password to login:
username: ****** password: ****** you can login
south west of page. if you need translation go to
http://www.*****.net/dic/.
Token & SessionID. Stolen SessionID within its life cycle, means
that the account is stolen [42]. Our inspection revealed 21298 ses-
sion and token IDs. Though at the time of writing this paper we
cannot verify the persistence of vulnerability, considering the fact
that sessions authenticate users, we can understand the risk posed
to individuals’ security and privacy at the time of the crash. More-
over, in our analysis, we noticed the presence of 7000 Tokens (as
more severe authentication method compared to session IDs). The
below URL depicts one of the samples with token Id.
https://******.com/*****/Main/Login_WS.aspx?
tokenid=880217f4-94c3-496d-8628-b2388b4ef299
Contact Information. During our data analysis, we dealt with a
significant number of contact information some laid in URL while
the others were provided by users intentionally in the description
field to receive further support. Among these records, the latter
is specifically more threatening as can be used to launch a tar-
geted attack against the inexpert user. The attacker with access
to such records may easily undermine users’ security and privacy
by contacting the user as a member of browser’s support team to
deceive the user to install a Malware or request additional infor-
mation from the target
Please call me at ****** to discuss details about
missing info on my ebay bid pages. Never a problem in
the past, now an everyday problem.
Similarly, we noticed a considerable number of phone numbers
laid in url. Below demonstrates a number embedded inside URL.
http://******/jcp/OrderDetail.aspx?context=OrderHist
&iia=ya3z*****ZTtG&pid=1&OrderNum=******&Phone=******/
5 INSIGHT AND COUNTERMEASURES
A variety of direct and indirect factors contributed to the privacy
harm caused by this data leakage incident. Factors such as disre-
garding the importance of data retention and its impacts on users’
privacy and security [5, 6, 11], improper use of GET method and
the human error [21, 40, 41] in disclosing users’ information.While
these kinds of factors are widely discussed, yet they are inevitable
and as the result, we witness an unprecedented wave of data leak-
ages. Therefore, in this section, we propose a hotfix that can be
deployed into the current ACRS, helping to enhance the security
and privacy of users against such a data disclosure, by removing
sensitive information from the crash report.
5.1 Client Side Data Sanitization
In the case of ACRS, both server and client side approaches can
be employed to enhance users’ privacy and security by removing
sensitive information from the reports. While removing the users’
sensitive data at the server sidemay providemore flexibility for the
developers to get the best readability of a report, the user should
not be obligated to trust the developer and the system to send their
sensitive data to the server. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a
client side approach to remove sensitive data from the crash re-
port’s environmental information, aiming to safeguard users’ sen-
sitive data right at the client side. This approach, as a hotfix to the
current ACRS implementation, can be easily integrated with the
popular ACRS distributions ([14, 17]), aiming to sanitize users’ pri-
vate information such as username, password, and social security
number without any impact on the bug fixation and with minimal
or no impact on the readability of reports. Unlike [7] and [9] which
only focused on sanitizing minidump, we consider the crash run-
time information and supportive data including description field
and URL. Similar to [7], we hypothesize that developers do not
want to get occupied by users’ sensitive data.
To sanitize a report at the client, we developed a light weight
script which parses the URL and user’s description field and re-
moves the private information prior to transferring them to the
Processor. The program masks the possible sensitive data from the
crash report based on the predefined list of sensitive data (which
can be defined by developers). The program takes URL and descrip-
tion as input and checks them against an array of predefined sen-
sitive keywords which may appear in those fields. In case of any
match, the program masks the following 4 characters of the sensi-
tive keyword. The result will be a sanitized report where sensitive
data is unusable (or difficult to guess) in case of an unauthorized
access, but at the same time the report maintains its readability for
the debugging purpose.
We define readability as a situation where developers are able
to replicate the crash. For instance, in case of a browser crash, de-
velopers may require the visited URL in addition to stack trace in-
formation. From the URL developers are specifically looking for
details like the name of the visited website and status where the
crash occurred (e.g., posting a form). While our hotfix leaves these
details untouched, it masks users’ sensitive informationwhichmay
exist inside URL and is not in the interest of developers (similar to
[7] hypothesis). Similarly, using our hotfix, a URL that carries to-
ken ID will be unusable by attacker for the purpose of login, as its
first 4 digits are masked, but it still denotes the necessary details
which are required for the debugging purpose. Depending on the
URL or description field, the list may include keywords such as
username, password, token, and session ID. The list of keywords
can be defined by developers, giving them the opportunity to make
a balance between users’ privacy and readability required for the
crash debugging. Algorithm 1, represents our proposedmethod for
removing private data from the report and description field.
As a preliminary evaluation, we tested our program, against
500 independent records from description and url. To preserve
users’ privacy during the testing phase and to make sure that the
data is not traceable back to a user, we take some steps as follow.
First, we tested each field independently to ensure that data is seg-
regated from the other fields in the same record and therefore is
not traceable back to users. Second, for the case of URL sanitiza-
tion, we replaced the domain names with the www.example.com
(replacing the domain names with the www.example.com was only
performed for the testing purpose. The application in the normal
Algorithm 1: Sanitizing Crash Report
Data: input (url, description)
Result: anonymized input
1 initialization;
2 lst = [x,y,z];
3 open input;
4 for <line in input> do
5 for <i in lst> do
6 regex = ("lst[i]\\W+(\\w+)");
7 match= findall(regex, line);
8 line = line.replace(match, "****");
9 end
10 end
process keeps the domain untouched as the developers may need
it for the further analysis). After running our program against de-
identified records, we performed a manual check to assure that the
URLs’ readability is not compromised. The result of our manual
check showed that the program was fully successful in manipulat-
ing the keywords.
The results of our evaluation on 500 URLs carrying session ID
and 500 description fields carrying password show 100% success
rate on masking sensitive information from both fields. If we de-
fine readability such that the program still maintains all informa-
tion required to determine a crash root cause from the URL, includ-
ing the name of the website and possible application or directories,
the readability rate in the case of URL was over 92%. The result of
our manual check indicates that readability of 40 URLs out of 500
URLs has been impacted. As in some cases URL sanitization re-
moved insensitive characters from the URL or caused removal of
the accessed directory on the web application.
However, in the case of the description field, the result cannot be
quantitatively evaluated due to the qualitative nature of the read-
ability factor of the description field. To estimate the readability
rate of the description field a study should be conducted to ask de-
velopers with authorized access to the original and masked data to
compare and rank the readability of the descriptions. Given that
such a study may jeopardize the privacy of the users, we were not
able to conduct this study.
The proposed approach soundly works in the case of sanitiz-
ing URL, since the cases from which the keywords are derived
are relatively limited. However, the mass filtering of data may
result in removing insensitive information from the description
fields. As an example, developers choices for defining sessionID
in URL are likely limited to sessionid=, session=, and sid=. But
in the case of users’ description, we deal with a great volume of
uncertainty due to the infinite ways of writing and explaining a
topic. Spelling, use of abbreviation may also add more complica-
tion to the situation. For instance, while description ‘‘I saved
my username in browser, but using the saved password
it doesn’t get through the website! looks the password
is wrong!’’ contains no sensitive data, mass filtering turns it to
‘‘I saved my username****rowser, but using the saved
password ****oesn’t get through the website! looks
saved password ****rong!’’. It is not hard to guess that a con-
siderable fraction of the descriptions may follow the same pattern
and the outright filtering can result in the removal of insensitive
data. We were also unable to provide a report on the frequency of
such cases, since the process requires validation and manual com-
parison of the program’s output with the original report which
would raise ethical concerns and may violate users’ privacy.
Moreover, it should be considered that the impact on the read-
ability of the insensitive data remains negligible towards the final
process of fixing bugs considering the huge number of crash re-
ports received by the web browsers. In fact, many of the submitted
reports (approximately 90%) are tagged as duplicates, and are not
being processed [2, 36]. Further studies are required to examine
the result of applying more advanced data sanitization techniques
(e.g., [3, 20, 23, 26]) on the ACRS, including the use of natural lan-
guage processing and deep learning. However, compared to our
approach, applying these techniques may result in a total loss of a
report when it is classified as sensitive and would be computation-
ally expensive which may affect the system performance.
6 CONCLUSION
The plethora of data leakages has received a close review by the
media and research communities. However, no previous study has
been conducted in the context of browsers and the crash report-
ing systems. In this paper, we studied the disclosure of 2.5 million
records of browser crashes that had been collected by one of the
major browsers. In our inspection, we showed the potential pri-
vacy and security harm the current implementation of ACRS may
pose. Our work presents a crucial preemptive step to raise commu-
nity’s awareness of the security and privacy risks associated with
the current implementation of ACRS. Further,we proposed a hotfix
which masks the users’ sensitive data presented in the URL and de-
scription fieldwithout impacting the readability of the reports. Our
proposed hotfix can be integrated with the current implementation
of ACRS to safeguard users’ private data. While our proposed ap-
proach finely works toward protecting users private information,
further studies are required to examine more advanced and intelli-
gent techniques, including natural language processing and deep
learning techniques.
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